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Considerations of the sort here presented make it impossible for me to convince myself that the time has come to abandon the conception of selfhood as the ultimate category in metaphysics for that of pure experience or of objects existing independently of consciousness. Professor Woodbridge rightly warns the pragmatists against the tendency to do violence to the character of transcendence pertaining to the cognitive experience. That this character is put in jeopardy by their procedure I am forced to believe. But, in order to be just to this character, is it necessary, or even defensible, to postulate objects which are not dependent upon consciousness for their existence and their nature? Idealism, whatever its form, has difficulties in plenty; yet, to my mind, it indicates the direction in which the solution of our problems is to be sought, if it is to be found at all.

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REPLY TO DR. HUGHES

IN replying to the query of Dr. Hughes concerning my suggestions about a definition of consciousness, I hardly know how to make a more frank and open statement than the one which he seems to have found obscure. I hoped that the word 'empirical' used in the title would prevent misunderstanding. The question at issue is, of course, the question whether the distinction between public and private objects is a real distinction. In making it, it seems to me that I am in the region of the obvious and the commonplace. "Experience," I said, "contains objects not accidentally, but essentially, private, and it contains objects essentially public (I simply report the empirical situation, which may be as illusory as you like), and whether this division is important or not, it is empirically actual."¹ It seems to me that this distinction is empirically actual; I can not see how I could ever possibly have known my critic's views if he had not chosen to inform me of them. Let any teacher go into a classroom and sit silent before his class for an hour while the members absorb his opinions by the same direct inspection they give to his physical person. As an empirical distinction, the division into public and private objects seems to me so commonplace that it is superfluous to dwell upon it. Whether consequences for metaphysics can be gotten out of it is another matter.

The readiest way to defend idealism is to point out that my conclusion concerning that doctrine rests upon a large *If*. If the chair

¹ P. 566.

is not of the essentially private portion of experience, idealism collapses. It is open to the idealist to say that the chair, all there is of it, *is* consciousness and hence a private object. It is so because it must be, on the basis of the physiological theory of perception. I admit that this perfectly legitimate reply is not easy to refute. But I am convinced that *our* metaphysics should rest upon our own actual experience to-day, and it seems to me extremely desirable to give fresh and altogether empirical descriptions of that experience.

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REVIEWS AND ABSTRACTS OF LITERATURE

Le rôle du jugement dans les phénomènes affectifs. V. GIGNOUX. *Revue Philosophique*, September, 1905, pp. 233-259.

"My purpose is," says M. Gignoux, "to examine and classify certain facts from which there seems to me to result the means of an easy reconciliation between the two theories of emotion, the intellectualistic and the physiological" (p. 233). With this intention, one of harmony, rather than one of destructive criticism, M. Gignoux ably presents the function of judgment in the various emotional attitudes, going through the whole range, from the more or less organic through the esthetic and intellectual emotions.

Concerning the organic feelings of pleasure-pain we have two differing explanations. The one, purely physiological, posits as a basis of the emotion a certain excitation of end-organs and body. The other, purely intellectualistic, presupposes a judgment as the prime mover of certain emotional states. To support the latter view, we may call into service those cases in which a fixed idea affects the body pleasurably or otherwise, as in hypochondria. "This action of an idea on the visceral functions," says M. Gignoux, "is not at first sight clearly intelligible. . . . At present, we simply assert that, if many emotional states depend neither directly nor indirectly upon an intellectual state, many more arise from certain judgments, through the medium of organic conditions, which are often strongly influenced by these same judgments" (p. 237).

Higher than the purely organic feelings are the emotions of sadness or joy, etc., connected with the consciousness of our will-to-live, with judgments on the satisfaction or dissatisfaction of this tendency. All these emotions connected with the will-to-live are bound with organic concomitants. In fact, the work of James, Lange and Ribot has incontestably established the thesis, that in such cases of 'crude' response the emotion is the effect and not the cause of the body thrill. "But the immediate cause is not the original cause, and this immediate and organic antecedent of the emotion is itself very often the result of judgment alone. . . . The judgments which are the source of, and which direct the tendencies resulting in the emotion, are the following: (1) the perception of our conscious